We predict that accounting conservatism influences insiders' opportunities to speculate on good and bad news, and thus, insider trading profitability. We find that greater conditional (unconditional) conservatism is associated with lower (no effect on) insiders' profitability from sales. We find limited evidence that conservatism (of any kind) influences profitability from purchases. These findings are consistent with our hypotheses on the different informational roles of conditional and unconditional conservatism, and on the asymmetric influence of conservatism over the opportunities to speculate on good versus bad news. The research design takes into consideration the endogenous nature of insiders' profitability and conditional conservatism. The results are robust to different measures of conservatism and a number of additional analyses.
recognition of economic gains. This means that gains are recognized as the associated cash flows are realized (thus, often with a lag). This could lead investors to make incorrect inferences regarding firm's prospects. Then, conservatism would create opportunities for insiders to speculate on positive news, increasing profitability from purchases. A number of studies provide evidence that even sophisticated users of financial statements, such as analysts, do not fully understand conservatism (Helbok and Walker 2004; Pae and Thornton 2010; Louis, Lys, and Sun 2014) , giving credence to this view. On the other hand, the extant prior research suggests that conditional conservatism ameliorates the firm information environment, improving transparency and that conservatism is associated with improvements to corporate governance, lowering the incentives and abilities for opportunistic managerial behaviour (Watts 2003; Gao 2013) . Then, conservatism would reduce the opportunities to speculate on good news, acting as a disciplining mechanism that would lead to truthful disclosure of good news (Guay and Verrecchia 2007; LaFond and Watts 2008) .
We test our predictions on a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 2003 to 2014 (post SOX period). To measure insiders' profitability, we focus on opportunistic (e.g. those who are expected to trade on private information) insiders' sale and purchase transactions aggregated at a firm-day level. We classify firms as having high (low) profitability from sales/purchases if insiders earn (do not earn) abnormal returns from their transactions. To ensure the robustness of our results, we measure conservatism using two different proxies.
The first one is market-based in cross-section modified Basu (1997) , and the second firmspecific (Khan and Watts 2009 ). Both of the measures are modified in line with Banker et al. (2016) . In addition, to address potential endogeneity issues, we study the association between current changes in conservatism and future changes in insiders' profitability. Moreover, we employ the effect of an exogenous shock to conservatism: the mandatory adoption of SFAS-142. Further, we study whether our results are robust to different categories of insiders.
We separately analyze profitability of CEO and CFO, Top-5 insiders and all officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders. Additionally, we conduct a split sample analysis to better understand the demand side for conservative reporting and insiders' profitability. Finally, we study the impact of unconditional conservatism on insiders' profitability.
We report the following key findings. First, our results from the cross-sectional Banker et al. (2016) and modified Khan and Watts (2009) tests indicate timelier recognition of bad news in firms where insiders have lower profitability from sales. This result systematically holds for all officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders. For the group of CEO-CFO and Top-5 insiders the results are mixed with low negative statistical significance. Second, we find no systematic evidence of an effect over the profitability from purchases. This finding rejects the concerns that conditional conservatism withholds recognition of good news resulting in higher information asymmetry. Third, a set of robustness tests taking into consideration endogeneity issue support the previously indicated findings. Fourth, a split sample analysis documents that the demand side for conservative reporting from debtholders (proxied by firms with high debt and operation in high litigation industries) results in a more pronounced and negative effect on insiders' profitability from sales. Fifth, we find no evidence that insiders (all categories) benefit from unconditionally conservative reporting. This finding stay in line with those who find that unconditional conservatism (balance sheet conservatism)
does not lead to a significant noise of the reported values. Finally, we present that the relation between conditional conservatism and insiders' profitability is sensitive to the constraining effect of unconditional conservatism. In particular, high level of unconditional conservatism pre-empts the recognition of future bad news. Overall, our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables and to a battery of robustness tests.
Put together, the results of the study contribute to several streams of the literature. We contribute to the literature analysing information content of insider trading by showing that conditional conservatism reduces the ability of insiders to speculate on private information particularly, on bad news. Moreover, we add to those who find an evidence of a negative effect of insider trading (see, e.g., Ausubel 1990; Easley et al. 1996; Bernardo 2001; Cheng et al. 2006; Ellul and Panayides 2016) by proposing that conservatism acts as a mechanism against opportunistic behaviour of insiders towards speculation on negative news. Thus, advocating more conservative reporting should lead for a decreased abilities of insiders to speculate on private information. In contrast, we show that unconditional conservatism does not triggers greater insiders' profitability. Finally, we add to the literature on the positive economic consequences of conditional conservatism (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2002; Ahmed and Duellman 2007, 2011; Zhang 2008; Francis and Martin 2010; Louis, Sun, and Urcan 2012; Francis, Hasan, and Wu 2013; Kim et al. 2013; Kim and Zhang 2016) and the literature advocating reduction in information asymmetry due to conservative reporting (García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva 2014).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our hypotheses on the association between insider trading profitability and conditional (unconditional) conservatism. Section 3 contains the research design, and section 4 describes the data used.
Sections 5 presents the main results, while sections 6 discusses a number of robustness checks and additional analysis. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Our study integrates the stream of literature on accounting conservatism with the one on opportunistic use of private information by corporate insiders. Regarding insider trading, a number of studies provide evidence that insiders can earn abnormal returns by exploiting private information (Seyhun 1986; Rozeff and Zaman 1988; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Marin and Olivier 2008; Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor 2011) . Additionally, insider trading may not be Pareto optimal (Ausubel 1990) , increase cost of capital (Easley and O'hara 2004) , lower liquidity (Easley et al. 1996) and result in welfare losses to outsiders (Leland 1992) , lower value of a firm (Masson and Madhavan 1991) . We add to the literature on plausible mechanisms that limit the negative effect of insider trading by proposing a novel factor: accounting conservatism, that is expected to limit corporate insiders' profitability from sales.
Concerns exist that conservatism may lead to inefficient decision-making because of the bias it introduces in financial reporting (Guay and Verrecchia 2006; Gigler et al. 2009 ).
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However, most of the existing work concludes that conditional conservatism is an efficient mechanism associated with a number of positive economic consequences (Basu 1997; Watts 2003; Mora and Walker 2015) . In line with the latter literature, we present a bright side of conditional conservatism, acting as a tool against opportunistic behaviour of insiders in speculating on negative economic news. Moreover, we also aim to shed light on the issue of information asymmetry that arises due to conservative financial reporting. Particularly, the main assumption of the paper is that conditional conservatism mitigates asymmetries between shareholders, outsiders and corporate insiders through timelier recognition of losses.
We develop our arguments next.
Conditional conservatism and the opportunities of insiders to speculate on good and bad news
Managers are reluctant to disclose negative firm information (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009) . Bad news hoarding increases with the firms' opaqueness and complex tax planning (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian 2009; Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011) . However, conditional conservatism imposes lower verification requirements for the recognition of negative news (possible economic losses) relative to positive news (Basu 1997) . Additionally, conservatism, together with International Financial Reporting Standards, increases transparency and reduces crash risk (DeFond et al. 2015; Kim and Zhang 2016) . This leads to timely and complete dissemination of negative information that managers would otherwise withhold (Basu 1997; Watts 2003; Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner 2010) . We predict that by imposing timely and complete recognition of economic losses in the firm financial statements, conditional conservatism reduces insiders' opportunities to speculate on firm news, and particularly, on bad news. Our baseline argumentation is that managers may knowingly hide bad performance and reveal early a potential future growth of a firm to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. Conservative financial reporting is expected to act as a restraining mechanism towards such a behavior.
A growing body of research provides evidence consistent with the view that accounting conservatism reduces information asymmetry (LaFond and Watts 2008; García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva 2014) . For example, Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2013) , Kim et al. (2013) and Kim and Zhang (2016) find that through a decrease in information asymmetry, conservatism is able to mitigate negative market reactions to bad news associated with economic events. Overall, the evidence reported in this literature indicates that conditional conservatism is associated with improvements in information quality that ameliorate the firm information environment and allow investors to better assess firm performance. Thus, we expect that conditional conservatism limits the informational advantage of firm's insiders.
Reductions in information asymmetry are an important mechanism to reduce insiders' profitability, as for example, Aboody and Lev (2000) show greater profitability of insider trading in firms with greater information asymmetry.
Beyond this direct effect, a number of scholars have linked conditional conservatism to different firm attributes that, in turn, can have an impact on insiders' trading practices and profitability. For instance, prior work shows that conditional conservatism lowers agency conflicts and is associated with improvements in firm corporate governance. The evidence in Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) indicates that there is a positive relationship between accounting conservatism and institutional ownership, and Ahmed and Duellman (2007) show that conservatism is positively related with corporate governance. This evidence links with prior work on the profitability of insider trading, which indicates that, on average, bettergoverned firms have lower profitability of insider sales (Dai et al. 2016) , and that greater institutional ownership is negatively related with the profitability of insider trading (Bricker and Markarian 2015) . In closely linked research, the work of He and Rui (2016) finds a convex relationship between market returns of insider purchases and ownership concentration.
Further channels through which conservatism may affect insider trading include reductions in earnings management (Basu 1997; Watts 2003; Guay and Verrecchia 2006; Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang 2007; Gao 2013) , which should decrease insider-trading profitability since more profitable trades are possible in firms with greater levels of earnings management (Summers and Sweeney 1998; Sawicki and Shrestha 2008; Kraft, Lee, and Lopatta 2014) .
Finally, conservatism improves investment efficiency (Francis and Martin 2010; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2011; Ahmed and Duellman 2011; Louis, Sun, and Urcan 2012; García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva 2016) . Under conditional conservatism, managers cannot defer the recognition of losses to the next generation of managers. This serves to discipline managers ex ante and reduce the likelihood of investment in poorly performing projects.
Conditional conservatism also improves investment efficiency ex post, by imposing timely disclosure of poor realizations of ongoing investments, and triggering the early abandonment of poor projects. Overall, this results in lower managerial investment in negative NPV projects, which also alleviates possible information asymmetry coming from managers who try to withhold negative information about their investments. Lower investment in poor projects should lead to a reduction of opportunistic speculation on negative information from insiders.
Given the previously reviewed evidence, we expect that by imposing timely and complete recognition of losses conditional conservatism limits insiders opportunities to speculate on bad news. In addition, conditional conservatism is positively associated with a number of additional channels which have been shown to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of firm's insiders. Therefore, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Conditional conservatism is associated with a reduction in insiders' opportunities to speculate on negative news, which leads to a lower profitability from sales.
Regarding good news, conditional conservatism imposes higher verification thresholds for the recognition of economic gains (Basu 1997; Watts 2003) . This means that the pre-diction on the effects of conditional conservatism on insiders' opportunities to speculate on positive news is not as straightforward. On the one hand, all the previously documented mechanisms that are linked to greater conditional conservatism (i.e., better quality corporate governance, greater institutional investor ownership, lower investment in negative NPV projects, or lower earnings management) are hold for the recognition of good news. In addition, prior work suggests that conditional conservatism allows other softer sources of information to flourish (LaFond and Watts 2008) , lending credibility to good news disclosure and leading to full disclosure (Guay and Verrecchia 2007) . However, on the other hand, the lower timeliness of good news recognition can lead to incorrect inferences regarding a firm's prospects from the side of investors. In particular, the FASB (2005; argued that conservatism may trigger information asymmetry between informed and uninformed equity investors. In this regard, the higher verification standards for positive news could lead to information asymmetry that would grant higher opportunities for insiders to speculate on positive news. Thus, ultimately, the link between conservatism and the opportunities to speculate on a firm's good news is an empirical question. Following the aforementioned discussion, we propose to test the following second hypothesis:
H2: Conditional conservatism is associated with a decrease in insiders' opportunities to speculate on positive news, which leads to a lower profitability from purchases.
Unconditional conservatism and insider trading profitability
Unconditional conservatism refers to the persistent understatement of the book value of net assets (Beaver and Ryan 2005) , and is often viewed as introducing a bias of unknown magnitude into financial statements (Ball and Shivakumar 2005) and thus, as garbling the earnings signal and increasing information asymmetry. A classical example would be the immediate expensing of R&D costs. Under SFAS 2 Accounting for Research and Development Costs, all R&D outlays are considered expenses, independent of whether they represent successful in-novations or not. Insiders could be better informed about the future profitability associated with such investments, whilst investors would only observe the annual R&D expense.
Given this, we argue that conditional and unconditional conservatism have different effects on financial statements transparency. Particularly, they have different effects on the timing of accounting recognition. While the principal mechanism of conditional conservatism is its timely reaction to negative news, unconditional conservatism is news independent and prevents timely loss recognition (Beaver and Ryan 2005 , Pae, Thornton, and Welker 2005 Roychowdhury and Watts 2007 , but also, to potential over-reporting of losses which may never be realized. Indeed, unconditional conservatism may provide opportunities for earnings management, as it can result in the creation of 'cookie jar' reserves, that can be used to artificially increase earnings when past understatements reverse (Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000; Jackson and Liu 2009 ). In addition, the prior understatement of assets values (as a result of unconditional conservatism), restrains the firm future ability to record losses in a timely manner (Basu 2001 , Giner and Rees 2001 , Beaver and Ryan 2005 , Pae, Thornton, and Welker 2005 . This means that more unconditionally conservative firms have a constraint in signalling future negative economic events (Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang 2018) . Given this, it is likely that insiders can profitably trade on negative information in more unconditionally conservative firms. Formally stated:
H3: Unconditional conservatism increases insiders' opportunities to earn abnormal returns, which leads to a greater profitability from sales.
Regarding unconditional conservatism influence on insiders' opportunities to speculate on positive news, under unconditional conservatism, asset values are expected to present their lower bound estimates. This restrains the signalling of potential good news, increasing information asymmetry (Ball and Shivakumar 2005) . If negative news are not realized, unconditional conservatism could benefit insiders: knowing that the assets are undervalued in financial statements, insiders can purchase the stock and sell it in the future. However, the problem with this strategy is that even for insiders it would be difficult to time the unravelling of prior conservatism. It is not trivial to track when the company is going to realize gains as conservatism is a 'sticky' policy and partially embedded into accounting frameworks.
Firms may smooth realizations of retained earnings through time (lowering volatility in share prices). Contrary, they may realize retained earnings all at once. This would increase stock price. Thus, potentially, firm-insiders with perfect foresight and decision-rights on the timing of earnings realizations might profit from unconditional conservatism. This leads us to our final hypothesis:
H4: Unconditional conservatism increases insiders' opportunities to speculate on positive news, which leads to a greater profitability from purchases.
Research Design

Computation of insider trading
Given that insiders can trade due to liquidity needs, we consider only "opportunistic" insiders. In line with Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) we separate insiders into two categories: "routine" and "opportunistic". "Routine" insiders are those who trade based on their liquidity or other needs, and are defined as those who trade in the same month for at least three consecutive years. The rest of insiders are classified as opportunistic. Thus, at the beginning of each year insiders are classified into one of those two categories based on their trading history.
3 We hypothesize that if insiders' consistently earn profits on their trades, this should signal that those trades are based on private (nonpublic) information.
To compute insider trading profitability we follow Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor (2011) .
More specifically, we estimate the following four-factor Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model over 180 days after each transaction (sale and purchase).
where R i is firm's i daily return, R f is the daily risk-free interest rate, R mrt is market return, and SMB, HML and UMD are the Size, Book-to-Market and Momentum factors. Finally, α is the average daily risk-adjusted positive return for insider purchases. Conversely, -α represents profitability for insider sales. Appendix A provides a replication of Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor (2011) that validates our method to calculate insiders' profitability from sales and purchases. To come to firm-wide net transactions we separately account for daily net transactions of all officers and directors.
Measurement of accounting conservatism
To study the association between conditional conservatism and corporate insiders' profitability, we use two different proxies of conditional conservatism that are well-established in the literature. We explain them in turn.
3.2.1 Conditional conservatism using modified Basu (1997) In our first set of tests, we use the modified version of Basu (1997 ) model following Banker et al. (2016 . Authors argue that more timely recognition of bad news than good news of conservatism (Basu 1997) can arise from fundamentally different source -cost stickiness.
Particularly, to avoid adjustment and disposal costs that are associated with the alteration of a firms operations, managers retain some unused resources when sales fall. Correspondingly, when sales rise, managers are in need to add additional resources to meet the demand. Given these features, there is an asymmetric behavior of costs that can distort inferences about the level of conservative reporting. Overall, Banker et al. (2016) show that controlling for sticky costs reveals that conservatism estimates (Basu 1997 , Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev, 2013b , Collins, Hribar, and Tian 2014 are biased more than 25%.
"short-swing" rule: Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of1934).
The full model that incorporates sticky cost is as follows:
where E i,t /P i,t−1 is earnings at year t scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. RET is compounded market-adjusted CRSP stock return over the fiscal year t. DR is a dummy variable that equals one if RET is negative (i.e., in the case of bad news) and zero otherwise (i.e., good news). DS is a dummy variable that is equal to one if there is a decrease in sales from year t − 1 to t and zero otherwise. ∆S i,t /P i,t−1 is the change in sales from year t − 1 to year t that is scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year, and is an error term.
Appendix B contains further details on the calculations and definitions of all variables. In Eq.(2) the β 2 coefficient captures the timeliness of good news recognition, while β 3 measures the asymmetric timeliness of bad news recognition relative to good news, and captures the incremental timeliness of bad news. The sum of β 2 and β 3 measures the total timeliness of bad news recognition. In the presence of conservatism, β 3 is expected to be positive, significant and greater than β 2 .
To assess whether there is an impact of accounting conservatism on corporate insiders' profitability, we follow extant prior research in conservatism and modify Eq.(2) to include interaction terms with yearly average profitability of corporate insiders (P rof it) and control variables associated with insider trading. Moreover, in line with the literature, we add a number of controls that are likely to affect profitability of insiders. In particular, we control for the size of a firm, book-to-market ratio, return on assets and institutional ownership (Seyhun 1986; Rozeff and Zaman 1998; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005; Skaife, Veenman, and Wangerin 2013; Bricker and Markarian 2015; Massa et al. 2015) .
To control for a firm's information environment we use the number of analysts following the firm. The main regression under consideration is as follows:
where ψ is a firm-fixed effects that control for the cross-sectional correlation between the expected components of earnings and returns (Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev, 2013b) . ω is a year-fixed effect controlling for economy-wide temporal shocks. i,t are standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen 2009 ). X i,t is a set of control variables as described above. P rof it stands for profitability from sales or purchases. We expect to observe a difference in conditional conservatism between firms with high and low insiders' profitability.
In particular, under H1 and H2 we expect that β 7 , which captures the incremental timeliness of loss recognition relative to gains, will be negative and significant. We also expect that the sum of β 5 and β 7 , capturing the total timeliness of loss recognition, is different from zero.
We employ F-statistics to check whether β 7 is significantly different from zero.
Conditional conservatism using modified Khan and Watts (2009)
Our second measure of conditional conservatism is based on the approach suggested by Khan and Watts (2009) that permits calculating a firm-year measure of conditional conservatism.
Augmenting the Basu (1997) model, Khan and Watts (2009) relate timeliness of good news (referred as G Score) and incremental timeliness of bad news (referred as C Score ) to firmspecific characteristics (size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage). We follow Banker et al. (2016) and modify Khan and Watts (2009) model that incorporates sticky costs as follows:
where BM i,t−1 , LEV i,t−1 ,SIZE i,t−1 stand for the book-to-market ratio, leverage, and size (natural logarithm of the market value of equity), respectively, at the beginning of the fiscal year. Firm-year conditional conservatism measure, C Score, is defined as α 3 + α 6 BM i,t + α 9 LEV i,t + α 12 SIZE i,t . Firm-year measure of incremental timeliness of good news, G Score, Table 1 [Insert Table 1 about here]
Our firm-year measure of conditional conservatism (CSCORE) is the three-year aver-age of the sum of C Score (e.g., for year t, CSCORE is the average over years t, t − 1, and t − 2). 5 A greater value of CSCORE represents a higher degree of conditional conservatism.
In our tests, we control for determinants affecting insiders' profitability as defined in the literature. Our main regression under consideration is as follows:
where ψ is a firm-fixed effects to control for the firm-specific contracting environment. ω is a year-fixed effect controlling for economy-wide temporal shocks. i,t are standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen 2009 ). To mitigate the issue of reverse causality we introduce lagged insiders' profitability (P rof it i,t−1 ) The dependent variable is either profitability from sales or profitability from purchases, one at a time. The coefficient of interest is β 1 that is expected to be significant and negative under H1 and H2.
Unconditional conservatism
To measure unconditional conservatism we follow Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2018) , who measure it by the persistent downward bias in book value of equity. Book-to-market (BTM)
is a noisy measure of unconditional conservatism since there are some other factors (besides unconditional conservatism) that are likely to affect both book and market value of equity.
Thus, avoiding these factors would result in a biased proxy. Following Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2018) we extract other sources of variation in BTM. In particular, we control for growth and economic rents, distress, market sentiment, unrealized mark-to-market gains, and inflation. Controlling for these variables (that are expected drivers of BTM), the residual from the regression below captures unconditional conservative reporting. The main model under consideration is as follows:
+ β 4 1/ConsumerSentimentIndex i,t + β 5 1/S&P Index i,t + β 6 P rof itability i,t + β 7 CreditRating i,t + β 8 ReturnV olatility i,t + β 9 HighInf lation i,t + β 10 AOCI i,t
where BT M is the book value of assets divided by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. Long-term growth forecast and sales growth proxy for the expected growth of a firm. Industry concentration controls for the effect of a high rent that results in a lower BTM. 1/ConsumerSentimentIndex is a proxy for market sentiment and 1/S&P accounts for general level of prices that is expected to affect investors' sentiments. P rof itability,
CreditRating and ReturnV olatility are used to control for a distress. HighInf lation is an indicator variable that controls for inflation, because even without conservatism inflation can decrease BTM (Basu 1997) . AOCI is calculated as accumulated other comprehensive income scaled by total assets to proxy for the extent of fair value accounting. 6 . Eq.(3.3) is estimated with year and industry fixed effects. Residual from is a measure of unconditional conservatism (U CON S). To assist in interpretation of results we multiply U CON S by -1, so that the higher U CON S, the more unconditionally conservative the firm is. To control for possible measurement error, we use the three-year average of U CON S (e.g., for year t, U CON S is the average over years t, t − 1, and t − 2) 7 .
To test H3 and H4, we run Eq.(5) above, substituting CON S for U CON S. The coefficient of interest is again β 1 which now is expected to be positive and statistically significant. As before, the dependent variable is either profitability from sales or profitability from purchases, once at a time. We include firm-and year-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. (2010) shows that after the introduction of SOX there is an increase in informational content of Form 4. Moreover, he presents evidence of lower insiders' sales around SOX. Before August 2002, insiders needed to file their trades within ten days after the end of the calender month in which the transaction occurred, which could result in a delay of up to 40 days since the trade. After August 2002, SOX requires insiders to file their trades within two business days. Insiders' transactions become public information after they file their trades.
9 Includes a firm's Chairman of the Board, CEO, CFO, COO and President who are supposed to have better access to a firm-specific information in comparison with other insiders (Core et al. 2006) . follow the steps detalied in Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor (2011) in terms of our datacleaning process.
Accounting information comes from Compustat annual, and is merged with the insider trading data using six digits CUSIP. Data on daily share prices and returns comes from CRSP. The data on Institutional ownership is from Thomson Reuters 13F Holdings database.
Finally, analyst coverage data is from the I/B/E/S database. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the tests studying the association between a firm-insiders' profitability and the level of accounting conservatism.
Panel B contains variables used in the models of Banker et al. (2016) and modified Khan and Watts (2009) . Panel C contains the controls for insider trading profitability. Panel D presents descriptive evidence on the profitability from sales and purchases of different groups of insiders. Overall, the evidence reported in Table 1 is consistent with prior research, although it suggests that sample firms are slightly under performing, with over half of them (51.2%) experiencing bad news (DR=1). It can also be seen that, consistent with the previous literature, on average, insider purchases appear to be more profitable than sales.
Moreover, Panel D presents that trades conducted by the CEO and CFO and Top-5 insiders, on average, have higher returns compared to other officers and director. This is consistent with the fact that different insiders have different access to firm-specific information on which to speculate on. For completeness, we show results segregated into the 3 groups of insiders as previously described.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The first column presents results of Banker et al. (2016) raw model estimation, Eq.(2).
The incremental coefficient on negative news, DR × RET , is both positive and statistically significant (0.061; t-stat = 2.908). This is as expected and indicates that, on average, firms in the sample are conditionally conservative. The main results are presented in columns (2) to (7) 10 . The coefficient of interest is the interaction of incremental timeliness and insiders' profitability, (β 7 ). As represented in columns (2), (4) and (6) conservative reporting, on average, decreases insiders' profit from sales. However, this effect is statistically significant only in case of all officer and directors (excluding Top-5 insiders, column (6)) (-0.352, t-stat=-2.327). Additionally, F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the negative news timeliness coefficient (β 7 ) is equal to zero (p-value = 0.04). Overall, this evidence is consistent with lower insiders' profitability from sales in more conditionally conservative firms. On average, higher conditional conservatism is associated with less opportunities to speculate on negative news.
Columns (3), (5) and (7) present the results on the association between conditional conservatism and insiders' profitability from purchases. As before, we consider three groups 10 We do not report the estimation results of control variables for brevity.
of insiders. The results indicate the negative association (for CEO-CFO and Top-5 insiders)
as predicted in H1. However, the effect of conditional conservatism on insiders profitability from purchases is statistically insignificant (-0.436, t-stat=-1.696; -0.328, t-stat=-1.596; 0.086, t-stat=0.724). Additionally, F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the negative news timeliness coefficient (β 7 ) is equal to zero. Overall, our results accept H1 and fail to accept H2. In particular, we find that conditional conservatism limits (does not limit) the ability of insiders (but not in case of CEO-CFO and Top-5) to speculate on negative (positive) news. Khan and Watts (2009) [Insert Table 3 ] Table 3 presents the estimation results of Eq. (5), where we use firm-year measure of conditional conservatism (CSCORE) based on modified model of Khan and Watts (2009) . As before, we study the effect across three different groups of insiders. As predicted, there is a negative association between conditional conservatism and insiders' profitability from sales.
Conditional conservatism as measured by modified
The coefficient of CSCORE is negative and significant for all types of insiders, columns (1),
(2) and (3). This evidence is consistent with H1 that higher levels of conditional conservatism are associated with lower insiders' profitability from sales. The results are weakly significant for CEO-CFO and Top-5 insiders' groups (under 10% significance level), but highly significant for officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders (under 1% significance) (-0.343, t-stat = -1.914; -0.248, t-stat = -2.034; -0.201, t-stat = -4.778). Additionally, F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the measure of conditional conservatism (β 1 ) is equal to zero.
Columns (2), (4) and (6) present the results on the association between conditional conservatism and profitability from purchases. As in Table 2 the effect is statistically insignificant. Additionally, F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the measure of conditional conservatism (β 1 ) is not equal to zero.
Overall, our results thus far support H1, as we provide evidence of a negative asso-ciation between conditional conservatism and insiders' profitability from sales. We fail to accept H2 consistent with the idea that conditional conservatism does not limit opportu- 
Endogeneity
A concern with our results thus far is endogeneity, in particular, reverse causality. One may argue that more insider trading-prone firms are more likely to use conservative reporting. In our main analysis we try to control for this issue. First, conservatism is a stable accounting attribute, which is the result of accounting choices and regulations that are fairly exogenous to the existing generation of managers (Khan and Watts 2009 ). In our analyses, we construct our conservatism proxy as a three-year average so that it serves as a predetermined level.
Second, we include in our models time-and firm-fixed effects to account for economy-wide temporal shocks and firm-specific contracting environment. Third, to mitigate the issue of reverse causality we introduce lagged insiders' profitability (P rof it i,t−1 ). Fourth, we study the effect of conservative reporting on insiders' profitability within different groups of insiders that are expected to have different quality of private information regarding a firm. However, we cannot entirely rule out endogeneity issue. A perfect experimental setting would be an exogenous shock to conservative reporting. However, due to the absence of such a shock we propose additional analysis to mitigate endogeneity concern.
A change analysis
To address the above concerns of endogeneity, our first set of tests employs a change analysis.
In particular, we study the association between current changes in conservatism and future changes in insiders' profitability. Additionally, to mitigate the issue of reverse causality we introduce a current change in insiders' profitability (P rof it i,t ). Our main regression under consideration is as follows:
∆P rof it i,t+1 = β 0 + β 1 ∆CSCORE i,t + β 2 ∆P rof it i,t + β 3 ∆Controls i,t + ψ i,t + ω i,t + i,t (7)
[Insert Table 4 ] Table 4 presents the estimation results of Eq. (7), where we use firm-year measure of conditional conservatism (CSCORE) based on modified model of Khan and Watts (2009) .
As before, we study the effect across three different groups of insiders. Columns (1), (3) and (5) indicate a negative association between conditional conservatism and insiders' profitability from sales. However, the results are only significant for all officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders (-0.192, t-stat=-3.165 ). Additionally, for this group of insiders Ftest rejects the null hypothesis that the measure of conditional conservatism (β 1 ) is equal to zero (p-value=0.01). Interestingly, columns (2), (4) and (6) indicate a positive association between conditional conservatism and insiders' profitability from purchases. The results are statistically significant for CEO-CFO group of insiders (2.074, t-stat=2.993). Moreover, for this group F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the measure of conditional conservatism (β 1 ) is equal to zero (p-value = 0.01).
Overall, findings in Table 4 that current changes in conservatism are associated with a decrease in insiders' abilities to exploit private information. This, results in lower profitability from sales. However, as before we find the effect is negative only for the group of officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders. Additionally, it is shown that CEO and CFO are able to profit from the asymmetric timeliness of positive news recognition. To sum up, on average, we find that conservatism serves as a corporate governance mechanism constraining insiders' profitability from sales. However, this effect differs within groups of insiders who posses different level of access to firm-specific private information.
Conditional Conservatism and Insider trading, evidence from SFAS 142
As a further robustness test that takes into consideration endogeneity concerns, we use the adoption of SFAS 142 as a plausible external shock to conservatism. In particular, we follow Cedergren, Lev, and Zarowin (2017) the value of the transaction is less than the bottom 1 percent or more than 100 percent of the firm's market value at the beginning of the fiscal year.
11 Before SFAS 142 provision, firms amortized goodwill over a period not exceeding 40 years.
To test whether the passage of SFAS 142 has an impact on a firm-insiders' profitability within our sample we consider the following regression:
P rof it i,t = β 0 + β 1 SF AS + β 2 P rof it i,t−1 + β 3 Controls i,t + ψ i,t + ω i,t + i,t
We control for lagged profitability (P rof it i,t−1 ). As before, we include quarter fixedeffects (ψ), firm-fixed effects (ω) and clustered standard errors by firm and quarter ( ).
SF AS is a dummy variable equal to one for all observations after 2001-Q2, when SFAS 142
became effective, and zero otherwise. We isolate a sub-sample of firms with acquisition that are present in the pre-and post-SFAS 142 periods: that is, years 2000-Q2 and 2002-Q2.
Then we estimate Eq.(8) and examine whether β 1 is negative and statistically significant.
For the sample under consideration there is an average increase in C score from 0.21 to 0.32 (t-stat = -34.147) for the pre-and post-SFAS sample of firms. This indicates an overall increase in conservative reporting within the analyzed period.
[Insert Table 5 ] Table 5 presents the results on our causal analysis on the links between accounting conservatism and insiders' profitability. The coefficient of SF AS, β 1 , is negative and statistically significant only for the sample of officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders (see column (3)). Additionally, for this group of insiders F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the negative effect on insiders' profitability (β 1 ) is equal to zero (p-value = 0.03). Overall, we do not find any evidence indicating that an exogenous increase in accounting conservatism led to a statistically significant decrease in profitability of insiders' from purchases for the above group of insiders (We do not report the results of a shock on profitability of purchases of Top-5 and CEO-CFO groups due to insufficient number of observations).
Overall, given the restrictions imposed on our sample in these tests, we still fail to assure causality of our results. However, this section provides additional support for H1 on the negative association between accounting conservatism and a insiders' profitability from sales. The results on H2 are more mixed, but suggest that there may be a positive association between accounting conservatism and a firm-insiders' profitability from purchases. Overall, the findings of this section provide additional support to all our previous results.
Insiders' profitability and unconditional conservatism
In our third set of analysis, we study whether unconditional conservatism is associated with the profitability of sales (H3) and purchases (H4). To the extent that unconditional conservatism introduces a bias of unknown magnitude into financial statements, it may create opportunities for insiders to trade profitably.
[Insert Table 6 , 7 about here] Table 6 presents estimation results of Eq. (5), where CSCORE is substituted for U CON S.
It can be readily seen that β 1 is statistically insignificant both for insiders' profitability from purchases and sales for all groups of insiders, but not for officers and directors exluding Top-5 insiders. Table 7 presents the results for the association between current changes in unconditional conservatism and future changes in insiders' profitability. β 1 is statistically insignificant both for insiders' profitability from purchases and sales for all groups of insiders.
Thus, we fail to accept the hypothesis that insiders' benefit from unconditionally conservative reporting. Overall, our findings stay in line with those who find that unconditional conservatism (balance sheet conservatism) does not lead to a significant noise of the reported values. Which is supported by the fact that it is not contracting neutral and results in better contracting terms (e.g. lower borrowing costs) (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang 2018) .
Additional Analyses
This section presents additional tests to shed light on the underlying mechanism and ensure robustness of the conclusions drawn so far.
Split sample analysis
In this section we conduct a split sample analysis to better understand the effects of conservative reporting on insiders' profitability. Each year a firm is classified as having high (low) firm-specific feature if a firm is above (below) the median of the Fama and French 48-industry classification in the sample. We expect the effect of conservatism to be more pronounced in the sample of firms with higher debtholder concerns. Specifically, we analyze sample within high and low litigation risk industries. Additionally, we separate firms into having high (low) level of debt issuance. We measure debt issuance as long-term debt issuance, minus the reduction in long-term debt, plus changes in current debt. Finally, we study the effect of conservatism on firms with high (low) information asymmetry. First, we study overall informational opaqueness of the firm proxied by the bid-ask spread. Second, we analyze firms within the context of textual disclosure. In particular, we consider a proxy for "readability" of financial disclosures -Bog index (Bonsall et al. 2017) . It captures linguistic attributes (e.g. length of sentences, complex words, jargon, etc.) that are associated with the costs of the language used in financial disclosure. The higher is the Bog index, the lower is the level of financial disclosure readability.
[Insert Table 8 about here] Table 8 presents the results for the split sample analysis. Panel A splits firm into high and low litigation industries. As expected, the effect of conditional conservatism on insiders'
profitability is more pronounced in the sample of firms which have higher litigation risk. In particular, the effect becomes statistically significant for the sample of CEO-CFO (-0.160; t-stat = -2.383) and Top-5 insiders (-0.128; t-stat = -1.863). For the sample of officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders the effect turns out to have higher statistical significance.
Additionally, this type of insiders appear to benefit from purchases (0.116; t-stat = 1.839).
Panel B splits the sample into firms with high and low levels of debt. As before, the effect of conditional conservatism become statistically significant for Top-5 insiders when the level of debt is high (-0.268; t-stat = -2.164). For the sample of officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders the effect turns out to have higher statistical significance. In addition, CEO-CFO appear to have higher profitability from purchases when the debt issuance is high.
Panel C and D split sample into high and low levels of information asymmetry. On the one hand, insiders have higher profitability from their trades under higher information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev 2000) . On the other hand, given higher informational asymmetry debtholders are expected to require higher level of conservatism to reduce their concerns.
Panel C presents that there is a negative effect of conditional conservatism on insiders' profitability from sales. This effect is statistically significant for all groups of insiders (-0.254, t-stat = -2.852; -0.309, t-stat = -3.504; -0.113, t-stat = -2.220). In contrast, when there is high information asymmetry, the effect of conservatism on insiders' profitability is nega- However, when the readability of financial disclosure is bad, the effect of conservatism on insiders' profitability is negative and statistically significant just for the sample of officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders (-0.110; t-stat = -2.484).
Overall, this section sheds additional light on all our previous findings. First, we demonstrate that the demand side from the side of debtholders for conservative reporting (in high litigation industries and firms with higher debt) results in a more pronounced and negative effect on insiders' profitability from sales. Second, we document that the effect of conditional conservatism on the profitability from sales of CEO-CFO and Top-5 insiders is negative and statistically significant only when there is a low informational opaqueness of a firm. In contrast, the effect on the profitability of officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders is negative and statistically significant under all sub-samples. This evidence supports the fact that CEO-CFO and Top-5 are the insiders with the access to highest quality firm-specific information. This gives them more incentives and opportunities to engage in opportunistic behavior (e.g. insider trading) when there are less chances to be caught and under low managerial control (e.g. higher informational asymmetry, low litigation risk, etc.). Finally, the results on the effect of conditional conservatism on insiders' profitability from purchases suggest that there might be positive association given different firm-specific attributes.
Additional Control Variables
So far our results document a strong evidence that accounting conservatism is associated with lower insiders' profitability from sales. However, it is import to consider additional control variables that are likely to affect insiders' profitability. In particular, to the extent that CEOs drive corporate culture (Bushman et al. 2017 ) and carries out policies in the firm (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008) we control for CEO characteristics. In particular, age, tenure, shareholdings and gender. Additionally, given that an increase in a firm size might be due to inflation rather than growth, we introduce inflation-adjusted size measure.
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[Insert Table 9 about here] Table 9 presents the results of Eq.(5) including additional control variables. The results indicate that conditional conservatism is associated with a decrease in profitability from sales for officers and directors excluding Top-5 insiders. Interestingly, the effect on profitability from purchases is positive and statistically significant. Additionally, Age is expected to reduce profitability from insider sales, while T enure is positively associated with the profitability from sales, but not purchases. Overall, our results stay in line with the previous conclusions.
Moderating effect of unconditional conservatism
In this section we analyze the constraint hypothesis discussed by Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2018) . Past high levels of unconditional conservatism might pre-empt the recognition of future bad news. For example, in the case of accelerated depreciation, the write-offs lead to more conservative values early on, but also, limits future write-offs in case of negative expectations regarding a firm's prospects: i.e., assets can only be written-off once. Overall, we would expect higher effect of conditional conservatism on insiders' profitability when there is a low level of past unconditional conservatism (i.e. higher ability for bad news recognition).
[Insert Table 10 about here] Table 10 presents the association between unconditional conservatism and insiders' profitability from sales by level of unconditional conservatism. Following Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2018), we split a sample into firms having high (low) levels of unconditional conservatism. For brevity we report the results for all officers and directors excluding Top-5
insiders. The results indicate that the coefficient on U CON S in the first column (low level) is higher (-0.312) and statistically significant under 1% significance level (t-stat = -4.272). In contrast, for the group of high level of unconditional conservatism U CON S is lower (-0.159) and statistically significant under 10% significance level (t-stat = -1.916). The results for the profitability of insiders' purchases are statistically insignificant. Overall, these findings indicate that the relation between conditional conservatism and insiders' profitability in sensitive to the constraining effect of unconditional conservatism.
Additional robustness tests
Finally, we conduct a number of additional robustness tests. Fist, we increase our sample from 1996 to 2014. Our results stay in line with the main conclusions. Second, we calculate insider's profitability over a one-year period (instead of 180 days). We still find that accounting conservatism negatively affects insiders' profitability from sales. However, the effect on profitability of insiders' purchases is insignificant in this longer window.
Summary and Conclusion
We predict that accounting conservatism influences insiders' opportunities to speculate on good and bad news, and thus, insider trading profitability. We find that greater conditional (unconditional) conservatism is associated with lower (no effect on) insiders' profitability from sales. We also find limited evidence of a positive association between conservatism and insiders' profitability from purchases, although this result is sensitive to model specification.
We measure conservatism using a number of different proxies, and our research design takes into consideration the endogenous nature of insiders' profitability.
Our results are consistent with our hypotheses on the different informational roles of conditional and unconditional conservatism, and on the asymmetric influence of conservatism over the opportunities to speculate on good versus bad news. In particular, our evidence suggests that conditional conservatism ameliorates the firm information environment, and that timely and complete recognition of losses reduces the opportunities for insiders to speculate on negative news. In contrast, greater unconditional conservatism does not seems to lead to greater information asymmetry and further opportunities for insiders to profitably trade on their private information. These findings may be of particular interest for regulators, given the ongoing debate on the desirable properties of accounting information.
Our study has a number of limitations. In particular, the main concern is endogeneity issue. Even though we try to cope with it, the lack of a proper exogenous shock moves away our results from causality. Second, we can not control for how good (honest) are firms' insiders that can partially account for their insider trading patterns. While we do not have data available regarding this factor, we do not expect it to significantly bias our results.
A Appendix: Insider Trading Profitability
We present results for the estimation of trade-specific returns following daily transactions of all opportunistic insiders. This table replicates results of Table 3 in Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor (2011) . Averaging trading profitability from sales and purchases represents that risk-adjusted return is positive and statistically significant (0.008; t-stat = 6.845). Moreover, purchase transactions earn positive and statistically significant return (0.083, t-stat = 26.205). In addition, we find that opportunistic insiders do not earn positive return from sales (-0.009, t-stat = -7.952) (Seyhun 1986; Lakonishok and Lee 2001, Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor 2011) .
VARIABLES All Trades Purchase Trades Sales Trades
Trading Profit 0.008*** 0.083*** -0.009** Panel A: Variables associated with accounting conservatism X Net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value of equity RET Twelve-month market-adjusted stock return ending the last day of fiscal year t DR A dummy variable, which equals one in case of negative or zero market adjusted stock returns (case of bad news) and zero otherwise (case of good news) ∆S/P Is the sales change scaled by the market value of equity beginning of the fiscal year DS Is a dummy variable equal to one if sales decreased from the prior to the current fiscal year G Score
Timeliness of good news based of modified Khan and Watts (2009) 
C Score
Timeliness of bad news based on modified Khan and Watts (2009) CSCORE
A firm-year measure of conditional conservatism. To mitigate the measurement error a three year average of C Score is considered (e.g. for year t the average consists of t, t-1, t-2).
U CON S
A firm-year measure of unconditional conservatism computed as in Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2018) Panel B: Control variables for insider trading Log(Size) A firm size measured as natural logarithm of market value of equity B/M Book (total assets minus total liabilities) to market (total shares outstanding times price) ratio Leverage Long-term debt issue plus current liabilities scaled by total assets ROA Net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets Inst.Ownership
Institutional ownership represented as the percentage of common shares outstanding owned by institutional shareholders log(1 + analyst) Natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm Panel A presents descriptive statistics of C score and G score as in Khan and Watts (2009) . Panel B contains variables used in the Basu (1997) and Khan and Watts (2009) models. Panel C contains the variables that are used as controls for insider trading profitability. Panel D presents descriptive evidence on the profitability of different groups of insiders. All of the variables are defined in Table B . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. (3) . All the variables are as described in Table B . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. (5) . All the variables are as described in Table B . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. . In particular, we study the association between current changes in conservatism and future changes in insiders' profitability. The dependent variable is P rof it i,t+1 . All the variables are as described in Table 4 . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. In particular, we study the effect of an exogenous change in conservatism on insiders' profitability from their trades. The dependent variable is profitability from sales or purchases. All the variables are as described in Table 4 . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. (5) substituting CSCORE for U CON S. All the variables are as described in Table B . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. (7) substituting CSORE for U CON S. In particular, we study the association between current changes in conservatism and future changes in insiders' profitability. The dependent variable is P rof it i,t+1 . All the variables are as described in Table 4 . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. (8) . In particular, we study the effect of an exogenous change in conservatism on insiders' profitability from their trades. The dependent variable is profitability from sales or purchases. All the variables are as described in Table 4 . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. This table reports the results for the estimation of Eq.(5) using additional control variables. All the variables are as described in Table B . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. This table reports the results of conditional conservatism on insiders' profitability in the low and high groups ranked by unconditional conservatism. All the variables are as described in Table B . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level.
